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The international debt crisis has highlighted the difficulties of 
using debt to finance investment in less-developed countries 
(LDCs). When a country's economic conditions deteriorate, 
repaying its foreign debts can be both politically and econom-
ically burdensome. During the debt crisis, a number of LDCs 
have been unwilling to meet their commitments to foreign 
lenders, resulting in a substantial reduction in investment in 
these countries. This has led to an interest in alternative forms 
of financing foreign investment which would reduce the in-
centive problems associated with debt and hence raise invest-
ment levels. 
Equity investment has been seen as a promising alternative 
to foreign debt. The hope has been that when the form of the 
foreign investment is such that the investors share in the for-
tunes of the enterprise, these incentive problems will be re-
duced. In particular, this will reduce the incentive of the host 
country's government to not enforce or to renege on the in-
vestors' claims after the investment is in place and therefore 
generate higher (more efficient) levels of investment. In the 
model developed in this paper, we explore one particular type 
of equity investment in which the foreign investor owns and 
operates a firm in the host country, direct investment, and un-
fortunately raise some doubts about this hope.1 
Any form of financing foreign investment must confront 
the difficulty of enforcing international contracts. Since there 
is not a well-developed legal system for doing that, interna-
tional investment contracts may need to be self-enforcing.2 
The Editorial Board for this paper was John H. Boyd, Edward J. Green, 
Preston J. Miller, and Martha L. Starr. 
Self-enforcement in this context means that without outside in-
tervention contracts must be such that the expected gains from 
breaking them do not outweigh the expected costs. A benefit 
of violating a foreign investor's property right and expropriat-
ing his or her investment is that the need to pay to acquire it 
is removed. One cost of expropriating is the reduction in fu-
ture investment that will result.3 We show that direct invest-
ment contracts may not always be self-enforcing. In particu-
*This is a revised version of a paper published in the Journal of International 
Economics (May 1991, vol. 30, no. 3-4, pp. 201-27): "Expropriation and Direct Invest-
ment" by Harold L. Cole and William B. English. The paper appears here with the per-
mission of Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland). © All rights reserved. 
0022-1996/91/S03.50. 
'There are two basic types of foreign investment: lending and equity investment. 
Foreign lenders can make loans to the government or to firms. (Of course, loans to 
firms may be guaranteed by the government.) Equity investment can be either direct in-
vestment, where the investor owns and operates a firm in the host country, or portfolio 
investment, where the investor holds shares of a firm but does not have control over the 
firm. While portfolio investment in LDCs has increased recently, most foreign invest-
ment has been in the form of loans to governments, government-guaranteed loans to 
firms, and direct investment. 
2For a discussion of the legal issues, see Bulow and Rogoff 1989, Appendix. For 
an excellent discussion of the handling of sovereign immunity in U.S. and British courts, 
see Alexander 1987. 
3Countries have asserted three main benefits from nationalization. (1) It lets them 
gain national control over natural resources such as oil or deposits of ores of various 
types. (2) It lets them pursue policies to promote domestic growth and equity. Countries 
have argued that foreign firms are bad for the domestic economy because the firms tend 
to use their economic and political power in the country to maximize profits rather than 
the welfare of the population. (3) Socialist governments have taken over foreign invest-
ment as part of a more general policy of nationalization, as happened in Cuba after 
1959. (See Sigmund 1980, pp. 13-19.) 
The costs of nationalization depend on whether or not the foreign investors are fully 
compensated. As long as the investors are fully compensated, the cost of the nationaliza-
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lar, the risk-sharing aspect of such contracts may be insuffi-
cient to fully offset the gains from expropriating in adverse 
economic conditions. We also show that direct investment 
contracts are more likely to be self-enforcing when the level 
of foreign investment is high. This suggests that for direct in-
vestment to succeed in raising foreign investment levels, inter-
national institutions or industrialized country governments may 
need to promote or help concentrate it. 
While economists have extensively studied the incentive 
problems associated with international debt contracts, there 
has been little work on direct investment. This is surprising 
given its importance. In the late 1980s, about one-third of the 
aggregate net long-term resource flows to LDCs took the form 
of direct investment. Since new private lending was negligible 
during this period, virtually all private capital flows were di-
rect investment. In 1988 and 1989, direct investment amounted 
to about $20 billion a year. Of this total, about $4 billion a 
year has come through debt/equity swap programs of some 
heavily indebted countries (World Bank 1991, pp. 9, 46). 
In the past, direct investors have faced a substantial risk of 
having the fruits of their investments expropriated. One esti-
mate suggests that about 11 percent of die direct investment 
made between 1956 and 1972 was expropriated without com-
pensation (Williams 1975). In addition, when compensation 
was made, it rarely covered the entire value of the expropriat-
ed capital and it was generally paid with a delay (Sigmund 
1980, Table 1). 
The fact that this high level of expropriation occurred even 
though the investors' governments have often been willing to 
intervene highlights the degree to which these contracts are in 
fact not self-enforcing. Until recently, the U.S. government 
was willing to intervene based on Cold War fears of the spread 
of communism. For example, the U.S. intervened in Guate-
mala in 1954 and imposed economic sanctions on Cuba in 
1960 (Sigmund 1980, pp. 87-89). Where expropriation has 
not been part of a move toward communism, the U.S. gov-
ernment has been less willing to intervene. For example, the 
U.S. supported Chile's takeover of the copper industry in the 
1960s (Sigmund 1980, p. 143). The cessation of the Cold 
War has probably reduced the willingness of developed-coun-
try governments to intervene to support the foreign investors' 
claims. Hence, direct investments in LDCs may become even 
riskier. 
A Strategic Model 
We consider a model of a small developing country in which 
the cost of expropriation is a loss of access to foreign capital 
goods and a permanent cessation of foreign direct investment. 
Since we assume that capital is long-lived, but cannot be di-
rectly purchased, the investment cutoff leads to a fall in the 
capital-to-labor ratio and, consequently, the level of per-capita 
income over time.4 This cost of expropriation is consistent 
with the historical evidence that successful, uncompensated 
nationalizations have required a domestic supply of skilled 
workers, a domestic marketing network, and an ability to ob-
tain spare parts from other sources, often in other countries 
(Sigmund 1980). 
Our model includes a host country that receives direct in-
vestment from a large number of small, identical, risk-neutral 
foreign investors whose real cost of capital is r. Agents in the 
host country have no capital, live forever, and grow in num-
ber at a constant rate n. There is only one consumption good 
in the model. The good is perishable, so must be consumed in 
the period it is produced. Agents can neither accumulate ad-
ditional capital by saving the consumption good nor consume 
capital directly. 
We make four basic assumptions about foreign investment 
in the host country. First, the foreign investors can costlessly 
invest in the host country. Second, competitive firms there rent 
foreign capital and hire domestic labor, using them to produce 
the one consumption good. Thus, capital and labor receive 
their marginal products. The rents earned on the capital in the 
host country belong to the foreign investors unless the gov-
ernment of the host country expropriates their assets. We 
allow only the government to take over foreign assets; we as-
sume individual firms cannot do so. Events in each time peri-
od t occur in this order: 
• Foreign agents decide whether or not to invest in the host 
country by renting capital to firms there. 
• Firms in the host country produce the consumption good. 
• The government in the host country decides whether or 
not to expropriate the foreign investment. 
• Agents in the host country consume the consumption 
good. 
tion is the compensation plus the losses resulting from suboptimal operation of the firm 
by the government due to such factors as inexperience and political constraints. In addi-
tion, the foreign investors may be able to limit or cut off access to spare parts for spe-
cialized machinery, skilled workers to operate the machinery, improvements in technol-
ogy, and marketing networks. In contrast, the cost of an uncompensated or partially 
compensated nationalization, while reduced by the smaller amount of compensation, 
also includes possible sanctions by the nationalized firms or their governments and a 
likely reduction in the future level of direct investment. (See the cases discussed in Sig-
mund 1980.) This last cost arises because the country may get a reputation for national-
izing, so it may no longer be able to obtain foreign direct investment. 
4In cases involving high-tech or proprietary capital, the assumption that an LDC 
could not replace the foreign capital seems reasonable. Without substantially changing 
the results, we could instead allow the country to either purchase capital abroad at a 
high price or produce domestic capital inefficiently. In either case, the level of con-
sumption in the economy's long-run steady state would be higher with direct investment 
than without it. The effect of expropriation would be to raise domestic income initially, 
but income would fall over time to the no-direct-investment steady-state level. Thus, ex-
propriation would imply a short-run gain and a long-run loss—just as it does in our 
model. 
13 Our third assumption is that the host country's government 
acts to maximize the welfare of the representative citizen. As 
a result, if the government chooses to expropriate foreign cap-
ital, then it will rent out that capital and distribute the profits 
to the population. Finally, we do not allow agents in the host 
country to purchase foreign capital or to borrow the consump-
tion good from foreign investors. These four assumptions 
greatly simplify the analysis. 
Since productivity shocks are observable, one might want 
to consider an optimal incentive-compatible contract similar 
to those studied by Worrall (1990) and Atkeson (1991). Such 
contracts would preclude expropriation and could raise wel-
fare. Since expropriation does occur, however, such contracts 
may not be of great practical interest. 
Our model is inherently strategic in that the actions of one 
agent, the host country's government, have a major effect on 
the returns earned by other agents, the foreign investors. Thus, 
the investment decision will be largely determined by the for-
eign investors' beliefs about the subsequent behavior of the 
government. Similarly, the government's decision to expropri-
ate will depend in part on its beliefs about the behavior of the 
foreign investors after such an action. Thus, in order to derive 
the optimal behavior of the investors and the government, we 
need to specify each of their beliefs about the actions of the 
other. Moreover, a description of an equilibrium of the model 
must state the actions taken in each situation and also the be-
liefs of the agents that rationalize these choices. We must 
specify beliefs not only for situations that arise in the equilib-
rium, but also for situations that do not. These beliefs are 
needed because the payoffs agents expect to get in these situa-
tions may affect their equilibrium behavior. We must also 
show that the beliefs are rational in the sense that the actual 
behavior of the agents coincides with their expected actions. 
In the particular set of equilibria we examine, the foreign 
investors will only invest if the host country's government has 
never taken over foreign investment. If the government were 
to expropriate any of the foreign-owned capital, then the for-
eign investors would never invest in the host country again. 
As a result, the capital-to-labor ratio in the host country would 
decline over time due to population growth. This form of stra-
tegic behavior by the foreign investors—known as a trigger 
strategy—is a method of promoting cooperative behavior on 
the part of the host country's government when other methods 
of contract enforcement are not available. The threat of retali-
ation (the cutoff of future investment) in response to a nonco-
operative action (the expropriation) can serve to discourage 
that sort of action. A key question in any model in which the 
threat of retaliation promotes cooperation is the plausibility of 
the threatened punishment. This problem is especially severe 
when the threat proves so effective a deterrent that the punish-
ment is never imposed. 
Formally, our strategic model is a game in which, in every 
period, the foreign investors choose how much to invest and 
then the host country's government chooses whether or not to 
take over that investment. Since the investment decision is 
made at the beginning of the period, a history for the foreign 
investors up until some time period t is a record of past in-
vestment and expropriation decisions. Since the government 
makes its decision after the foreign investors, a history up to 
time t for the government also includes the investment deci-
sion of the foreign investors in period t. A strategy is a se-
quence of prescriptions for an agent's decision in every period 
t and for every possible history up to t. Because all the inves-
tors are assumed to be small and identical, we restrict our-
selves to symmetric equilibria in which all the investors be-
have identically. Thus, we need only specify a single strategy 
for the foreign investors which gives their aggregate invest-
ment level for every possible history. A (subgame perfect 
Nash) equilibrium of a (complete information) game such as 
ours consists of a pair of strategies, one for each type of agent 
in the model, such that the prescribed action is in every case 
(at each point in time and for every possible history) optimal 
given the other agent's strategy and such that the future out-
comes will be determined by the players' strategies and the re-
sulting histories of outcomes. 
In this definition of an equilibrium, we set each agent's be-
liefs about the future conditional actions of the other agents 
equal to those agents' strategies. This means that these beliefs 
will at a minimum take into account the fact that the other 
agents are rational, optimizing agents. We then require that 
each agent's actions be optimal given the agent's beliefs. Note 
that in equilibrium no agent is ever surprised, so beliefs need 
never be reformulated. In addition, in order to rule out im-
plausible threats, we require that the strategies be optimal not 
only for histories that actually arise in equilibrium, but also 
for those that do not. 
Trigger strategy equilibria are only a small subset of the 
model's possible equilibria. The advantage of the equilibria 
we focus on here is their simplicity. All equilibria with posi-
tive net investment must be similar in two respects: there must 
be some sort of punishment to induce payment to the foreign 
investors, and the possible punishments must include a reduc-
tion in the level of investment.5 
One result in our model is not likely to be robust: expro-
priation is always complete. In the model, investors believe 
that any partial expropriation implies an intent to completely 
Extending the analysis to finite punishment intervals would be easy. Clearly, if the 
interval were too short, the only equilibrium would be one without any investment, 
since the cost of expropriation would be too low to keep the host country from expro-
priating. If the interval were not too short, however, investment would start again even-
tually. 
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expropriate in the future, so they cut off additional investment. 
In practice, of course, partial expropriation is possible, for 
example, through high taxation, exchange controls, or partial 
compensation. Such partial expropriation may not lead to an 
immediate exodus of all foreign investors (Eaton and Gerso-
vitz 1983). 
The Optimal Strategy for the Government.,. 
Now we formally analyze the incentive of the host country's 
government to expropriate foreign investment in an attempt 
to determine the conditions under which expropriation will 
occur. First, we specify the government's technology, prefer-
ences, and beliefs about the strategy of the foreign investors. 
Then we derive the government's optimal expropriation rule. 
(Later we verify that the government's beliefs about the be-
havior of the foreign investors' strategy are consistent with 
their actual behavior.) 
The host country has a Cobb-Douglas technology available 
to produce the consumption good. It is 
(1) Y, = ztF(KtfNt) = ztK?N}~a 
where Y is the total amount of the good produced, K is the 
amount of capital used to produce it, N is the amount of labor 
used, z is a productivity shock, and the parameter a is a posi-
tive fraction. We can write this production function in per-cap-
ita terms as 
(2) yt = zf(kt) = ztk? 
where y is the output per person and k is the capital-to-labor 
ratio. 
The productivity shock z is assumed to be independently 
and identically distributed with a time-independent continuous 
probability density function g(z). The shock has finite upper 
and lower bounds, z and z, with z > 0. The probability density 
function of z is assumed to be nonzero over (z,z). 
Agents in the host country receive an endowment of zw 
units of the consumption good each period. We think of this 
endowment as the output from an agricultural sector, that is, 
from the part of the economy that is not dependent on foreign 
capital. The host country agents are also each endowed with 
a unit of labor each period. 
A representative agent in the host country has these pref-
erences: 
(3) £,Ej3 
where the parameter (3 determines the extent to which the 
agent discounts future utility. The individual's utility u from 
consumption c exhibits constant relative risk aversion and is 
given by 
(4) u(c) = (c1"M)/(l-y). 
Here, the parameter y, which is constrained to be nonnegative, 
determines the curvature of the utility function and, hence, 
both the degree of risk aversion and the willingness to inter-
temporally substitute consumption. Leisure does not enter the 
agents' utility functions, so they each supply their one unit of 
labor inelastically each period. 
In the equilibria we consider, the foreign investors invest 
enough capital each period to keep the capital-to-labor ratio 
in the host country equal to its present level k until expropria-
tion occurs. As noted above, if the host country's government 
expropriates any of the foreign-owned capital, then the for-
eign investors will never invest again. (We show later that this 
strategy for the investors is optimal given the strategy of the 
host country's government.) Notice that the penalty for partial 
expropriation is the same as that for total expropriation. As a 
result, the host country's government will never choose to par-
tially expropriate. 
If the government chooses not to expropriate, then con-
sumption by the representative agent is 
(5) cXzt) = ztw + zM)-zM'(ky 
Note that the productivity shock is country-specific rather than 
industry-specific. Thus, it applies to both domestically owned 
sectors (the endowment) and foreign-owned sectors. 
If the government chooses to expropriate foreign capital at 
time t, then per-capita consumption at time t + i is 
(6) cf(zj = z,+/ w + ztJ{k(\+nyl). 
Notice that consumption is initially larger after an expropria-
tion; Co > cn. Thus, if the population did not grow, expropria-
tion would occur immediately. If, however, the rate of popu-
lation growth were positive, then expected consumption would 
decline after expropriation occurred. This decline in con-
sumption is what may induce the host country's government 
to honor the foreign claims on capital.6 
The government in the host country has a social welfare 
function given by7 
could model the cost of expropriation as caused by depreciation rather than 
population growth. This variation would be equivalent if the depreciation rate 5 were 
chosen by 1 - 6 = 1/(1+n), where n, recall, is the rate of population growth in the host 
country. 
7This social welfare function implies that the government cares only about those 
agents now living. If the government's rate of discount were P' = (l+n)p, then the gov-
ernment would discount the welfare of each generation at a rate (3. As long as (3' < 1, 
the results would not be greatly changed. 
15 (7) W = E,Y;~JU(CJ. 
The government maximizes social welfare each period simply 
by choosing whether or not to expropriate the foreign assets. 
It is useful to define two possible levels of welfare: 
(8) W7(zf) = II to) + Et £~J'M(c?(z,+,)) 
(9) W?(zt) = u(c\zt)) + pE,[ma. 
The term Wf(zt) is social welfare in period t if the government 
chooses to expropriate the foreign capital, and W?(zt) is social 
welfare if the government chooses not to do so. Using this 
notation, we can write the government's dynamic program-
ming problem as 
(10) Wt(zt) = maxtytoW®)}. 
This is an infinite-horizon problem with a stationary environ-
ment; that is, the government's preferences, the investors' 
strategies, and the productivity shocks are all time-invariant. 
Thus, the value functions Wt, W", and Wet are time-invariant. 
Moreover, if an optimal strategy exists, then a stationary opti-
mal strategy exists (Bertsekas 1976). Thus, we consider only 
stationary strategies.8 
An optimal strategy for this problem is to expropriate at 
time t if We(zt) > W(zf). Using the definitions in equations (8) 
and (9), we can write this condition as 
(11) u(cfct))+Et Y,~Ju(cXztH)) >u(cn(ztj) + p£,W(z,+1) 
(12) u(cfct)) -u(c\ztj) > 
The left side of (12) is the gain in utility today due to expro-
priation, which depends on zr The right side of (12) is the 
expected future cost of expropriating today, which is constant 
due to the time stationarity of the problem. 
We define T(zt) to be the total benefit for agents in the 
host country if their government expropriates foreign invest-
ment. This is the left side of the inequality in (12): 
(13) r(z,) = II(C<J(Z,)) - u(cn(zt)). 
Clearly, T(z) is continuous in z because the levels of con-
sumption are linear in z and the utility function is continuous. 
We define % to be those agents' expected future cost of ex-
propriation today, or the right side of (12): 
(14) X = PW,+1) - E, £°>m(c;(Z,+,)). 
It is straightforward to show that the expected future cost 
of expropriation is positive if the population of the host coun-
try is growing. To do so, note that, given the definition of W, 
EW > EWe. (The two would be equal only if expropriating 
were always at least as good as not expropriating.) TTius, 
(15) x a P5 £~0P'«(c;(z,+1+i)) - E, £,;Mcf(Z,+,)) 
or 
(16) X>E, " U(CKZJ)} > 0. 
The last inequality holds because, with the population grow-
ing, expected per-capita consumption drops over time after ex-
propriation. 
For a given cost of expropriation, there will be a set of re-
alizations of z for which f(z) > and then the host country's 
government will choose to expropriate the foreign assets. We 
call this set ZE: 
(17) Ze = {z|r(z)>x}. 
For other realizations of z, the government will not expropri-
ate the foreign assets; we call the set of such realizations Z": 
(18) Z" = {z|r(z)<x}. 
We define n to be prob[z e Z"], that is, the probability that 
the government will choose not to expropriate. 
Because T is continuous in z, ZE will be one or more inter-
vals in [z,z]. Moreover, if T is monotonically increasing in 
z, then the expropriation set is the interval (z*,z], where z* is 
the point where T(z) = % (benefits equal costs). Alternatively, 
if r is monotonically decreasing in z, then the expropriation 
set is [z,z*). Making use of our assumption that the prefer-
ences of agents in the host country exhibit constant relative 
risk aversion, we can write T as 
(19) T(z) = [zl-V(\-i)]{[w +f(k)]^-{w +f{k) - kf'{k)\-\ 
There are three cases of interest. First, if the degree of rel-
ative risk aversion y < 1, then the term in braces in (19) is a 
positive constant and the other term is increasing and concave 
in z. Moreover, the latter term is zero for z = 0 and goes to 
infinity as z rises without bound. Thus, when y< 1, expropria-
8There may be many nonstationary optimal strategies. For example, for the values 
of z that make the government indifferent between expropriating and not expropriating, 
it could have a time-dependent probability of expropriation. However, this would not 
affect the equilibrium because these z's occur with probability zero. 
16 Harold L. Cole, William B. English 
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tion occurs in good states, that is, when z is high. The second 
case of interest is when y > 1. Then both terms in (19) are 
negative. The first term is increasing and concave in z. In this 
case, the utility gain from expropriation goes to infinity as z 
goes to zero and goes to zero as z goes to infinity. Thus, ex-
propriation will be preferred in bad states. The third case is 
when y= 1. Here, utility is logarithmic, and the gain from ex-
propriation can be shown to be constant. Thus, expropriation 
happens either immediately or never. 
The intuition for these results is straightforward. Expropri-
ation can be thought of as occurring for one of two reasons: 
opportunism or desperation. When y< 1, the curvature of the 
utility function of the country's representative agent is not 
very large, and the agent is very willing to intertemporally 
substitute current consumption for future consumption. As a 
result, the utility gain from expropriation is largest when the 
consumption gain from it is largest, that is, when z is big. We 
call such governments opportunistic because they expropriate 
when the return on capital is high. In contrast, when y > 1, the 
utility function of the country's representative agent has more 
curvature, and the agent is more risk averse and less willing 
to substitute consumption intertemporally. As a result, the 
largest utility gain from expropriation occurs when z—and 
therefore consumption—is low, even though the consumption 
gain in that situation is small. These governments are desper-
ate: they choose to expropriate because consumption in their 
country is very low and their marginal utility is very high. In 
the case of log utility, these two effects offset each other.9 
Using successive substitution and time stationarity, we can 
show that the cost of expropriation is 
(20) x = [p(l-7i)/(l-N]^[^o) " "(OIz e Zj 
+ [(l-p)/(l-p7c)]£ E^P'kO - u{cT)\ 
The first term here is the cost due to the fact that expropriat-
ing today precludes expropriating tomorrow. The second term 
is the cost due to the decline in consumption over time as the 
capital-to-labor ratio falls. 
Other than the expropriation set, the cost of expropriation 
is affected by the rate of discount and the rate of population 
growth. The cost of expropriation can be shown to rise as the 
discount factor p rises. This dependence on the rate of dis-
count is intuitive. If p is high, the future cost is discounted 
less, and the government is less likely to choose to expropri-
ate. In fact, here the usual folk theorem result holds: for p 
sufficiently close to one, expropriation will never occur. The 
effect of a change in the rate of population growth is also 
straightforward. If population growth is faster, then the per-
capita capital stock declines more rapidly, so the cost of ex-
propriation is larger.10 
Equation (20) shows that the cost of expropriation is a 
function of the level of investment in future periods and the 
expropriation set in future periods. In the stationary equilibria 
we are focusing on, neither of these changes until expropria-
tion occurs. Because of our assumption of constant relative 
risk aversion preferences, the expropriation set is determined 
by a critical value of z, z*, at which the government is indif-
ferent between expropriating and not expropriating. This value 
satisfies 
(21) Hz*) = %(z*jc). 
Thus, for y < 1, z* satisfies 
(22) u(cfc*))-u(cn(z*)) 
= [P(1-7c)/(1-P7t)]£[M(CO0 - u(cn)\z e (z*,z]] 
+ [(l-p)/(l-p7i)]£ E^kO > u{cT)\ 
where n = prob(z e (z*,z]). A similar equation holds for y > 
1. Equation (22) implicitly defines z* as a function of k. That 
function is the reaction function for the host country's govern-
ment. Sample reaction functions are shown in Charts 1 and 2. 
(In the charts, the reaction functions are drawn for p = 0.96, 
n = 0.06, w = 2, and Cobb-Douglas production with a capital 
share o of 0.33. The distribution of z is uniform over (0.5, 
1.5). Details of the calculations are available from the authors 
on request.) 
Note that in the charts the government's reaction functions 
imply that the probability of expropriation falls as the level of 
investment rises. This result is generalized in the following 
proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1. //(z*)1"7 > [$(l-n)/(l-$n)]E[zl^\Ze], then 
the probability of expropriation mil be reduced by an increase 
in k and raised by an increase in w. 
Proof. See Cole and English 1991, pp. 221-27. 
The proposition shows that, for y < 1, the government's reac-
tion function is upward-sloping, while for y > 1, it is down-
ward-sloping. In either case, an increase in the endowment 
9This result, like many others, can be thought of in terms of income and substitu-
tion effects. As z rises, income in the host country rises. If the utility function curves at 
all, then the rise in income lowers marginal utility and so reduces the incentive to expro-
priate a given amount of the consumption good. As z rises, however, the amount of the 
consumption good gained from expropriation rises—thereby increasing the incentive to 
expropriate. For log utility, these income and substitution effects cancel. 
10Had we based our cost of expropriation on depreciation rather than population 
growth, this result would imply that foreign investors should use capital that depreciates 
rapidly. Doing so would raise the cost of expropriation for the host country. The effect 
of possible expropriation on the type of investment chosen is considered in Eaton and 
Gersovitz 1983, 1984. 
17 shifts the reaction function to the right. 
This proposition displays an important difference between 
international debt and equity contracts. Increased lending 
raises the probability of expropriation because it means that 
larger repayments will be required (Kletzer 1984, Sachs 
1984). But increased direct investment lowers the probability 
of expropriation. An investment increase raises the level of 
consumption both if expropriation occurs and if it does not. 
An investment increase does not, however, raise the level of 
consumption in the long run after expropriation. Thus, an in-
vestment increase exacerbates the decline in consumption 
after expropriation.1' 
The second part of the proposition—that an increase in w 
raises the probability of expropriation—is more obvious. 
Given our assumption of constant relative risk aversion pref-
erences, absolute risk aversion is decreasing in consumption. 
Thus, an increase in w lowers the cost of the more variable 
consumption path that results from expropriation. This makes 
expropriation a more attractive policy.12 
To understand why the condition in the proposition is 
needed, remember that the cost of expropriation has two parts. 
One is that, after one expropriation, the government can never 
expropriate again. The other is that, after an expropriation, the 
consumption trajectory declines. The condition in the prop-
osition makes the effect of changes in w and k on the first part 
small. Without that condition, an increase in w could make 
expropriation not only more desirable, but so much more de-
sirable in some states that it is worth delaying expropriation 
to get a particularly good state. In such cases, the proposi-
tion's results would be reversed. 
... And for the Foreign Investors 
Here we assume that foreign investors know that the host 
country's government will follow the expropriation rule just 
derived. We specify the investors' preferences and constraints 
given their beliefs, and then we derive their optimal level of 
investment in the host country. 
The level of investment by individual foreign investors is 
very small relative to the total amount of investment. Thus, 
each investor takes as given the amount of capital per capita 
in the host country. Therefore, the investors also take as given 
the marginal product of capital and the probability of expro-
priation. 
It is useful to define two levels of investor profits. If ex-
propriation does not occur in period t, then an investor's prof-
it Pt is 
(23) P1? = (l+ztRt)kt - (l+r)kt 
where ztRt is the rate of return on capital in the host country. 
If expropriation does occur, however, then the profit is simply 
(24) P? = -(l+r)kr 
Thus, the investor's problem is 
(25) P = maxk{nE[( 1 +zR)k \ z e Zn\ - (1 +r)k}. 
The first-order condition for an interior solution to this 
problem is 
(26) 0 = itE[{\+zR)k\z e Zn\ - (1+r). 
If this equality does not hold, then all of an agent's assets will 
be invested either at home (if the expression is negative) or 
abroad (if the expression is positive). This condition requires 
that the investor be indifferent about the location of invest-
ment as long as rates of return are equal (where the rates of 
return take account of the probability of expropriation and the 
states in which it occurs). Thus, the level of investment per 
capita in the host country is given by 
(27) nE[\ + zf\k)\z 6Z"]=l+r. 
Given the expropriation set for the host country's govern-
ment, this equation gives the reaction function for the inves-
tors, or the level of investment they will choose given a par-
ticular expropriation set chosen by the government. Two such 
reaction functions for r - 0.10 are shown in Charts 1 and 2.13 
Not surprisingly, the optimal level of investment rises as the 
probability of expropriation falls. 
Since in our model the marginal return on investment is 
higher than the world interest rate, equation (27) implies that 
the host country will not be able to raise an efficient amount 
1 lrThe effect that increases in direct investment have on the probability of expropria-
tion may help explain why foreign direct investment is concentrated in a small number 
of countries. For example, U.S. foreign direct investment in manufacturing corporations 
in non-Middle East LDCs was $18.8 billion in 1982 (U.S. 1985, Table IS3). Of this 
amount, 73 percent was in four countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
Of the investment in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, 61 percent went to five countries: 
Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. The reason for this 
concentration may be that, given a choice of investing in countries with different 
amounts of foreign-owned capital, firms choose to invest in those with a large amount. 
They would do so if the effect of the higher level of investment on the probability of 
expropriation outweighs its effect on the marginal product of capital. 
12This result may seem unrealistic since more than three-quarters of U.S. direct in-
vestment is in other developed countries (U.S. 1985, Table IS3). Our model is not in-
tended to apply to such investments, however, because these developed countries also 
have substantial direct investment in the United States. The two-sided nature of the di-
rect investment makes the government's expropriation decision more complex. In anoth-
er paper (Cole and English, forthcoming), we develop a model of two-sided equity in-
vestment which may be more appropriate in such circumstances. 
,3Charts 1 and 2 show the functions for y > 1 and y < 1. Notice that for a given 
probability of expropriation (say, a z* of 1), the level of investment is higher if y> 1. 
That is because expropriation occurs when the marginal product of capital is low. De-
tails of the calculations are available from the authors on request. 
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of capital due to fears that foreign investment will be national-
ized without compensation. This result is similar to that found 
in models of international debt (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981) 
and in simpler models of international direct investment 
(Eaton and Gersovitz 1983, 1984). 
Charts 1 and 2 
Sample Optimal Strategies for the Foreign Investors 
and the Host Country's Government 
Reaction Functions With the Parameter Values in Table 1 
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Equilibrium 
Thus far we have derived the best responses of the foreign in-
vestors and the government of the host country to the strate-
gies they believe the other agents in the model are following 
up to the time of expropriation. To determine the equilibrium 
strategies, we need to determine the equilibrium levels of k 
and z*. These are determined by equations (22) and (27). 
Since each agent's strategy is a best response to (or an opti-
mal response given) the conjectured behavior of the other 
agent, the prescribed actions are optimal at every node on the 
equilibrium path (every date and history realized in equilibri-
um) in which expropriation has not yet occurred. To verify 
that these strategies are a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, 
we must show that the strategies after expropriation and at 
nodes off the equilibrium path are best responses. 
Again, after an expropriation has occurred, the foreign in-
vestors will choose not to invest in the host country. Given 
their belief that the host country's government would expro-
priate any additional capital they invested, this is an optimal 
response. Similarly, given the government's belief that the 
foreign investors will never invest additional capital, the gov-
ernment's optimal response is to continue to expropriate the 
existing capital. Thus, the government's strategy is also a best 
response, and together these strategies are a Nash equilibrium. 
In order to show that these strategies are a subgame per-
fect equilibrium, we must also demonstrate that they are equi-
librium strategies for subgames starting from nodes off the 
equilibrium path. There are two such subgames after expro-
priation has occurred at least once. First, in any subgame that 
requires the host country's government to choose whether or 
not to expropriate after some amount of new capital has been 
invested, it will choose expropriation. This choice is optimal 
given the government's belief that no investor will invest 
again after the expropriation. Given this belief, expropriation 
has no cost but does have a certain gain. Second, in any sub-
game in which the government in the host country does not 
expropriate the existing capital (that is, does allow the foreign 
investors to have the return on the capital for a period), the 
foreign investors will still choose to make no additional in-
vestment. This is an optimal response because they believe 
that the host country's government will expropriate again next 
period and in every subsequent period. Thus, the strategies are 
a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Now we produce some examples to show that the equilib-
ria we have discussed exist for some values of the parameters. 
Table 1 displays the parameter values we assume (those used 
in Charts 1 and 2). Table 2 gives the equilibrium levels of in-
vestment and the expropriation sets for two situations: one 
with y< 1 and another with y> 1. The corresponding reaction 
functions are those seen in Charts 1 and 2. As is usual, the in-
19 tersections of the two agents' reaction functions are the equi-
libria of the model. 
Even though we are considering only trigger strategy equi-
libria with infinite punishment intervals, we can still have mul-
tiple equilibria. Charts 1 and 2 show cases (y's of 0.99 and 
1.01) in which there are three equilibria, one with no invest-
ment, one with zero probability of expropriation, and a third 
with an intermediate level of investment and a probability of 
expropriation between zero and one. 
It is fairly easy to see that the welfare level of the host 
country's government is highest in the equilibrium with the 
highest level of pre-expropriation direct investment. Note that 
for a given sequence of productivity shocks, the equilibria dif-
fer in only two key respects: the timing of the expropriation 
decision and the level of k. If, again for a given sequence of 
productivity shocks, we fix the timing of expropriation, then 
the level of consumption—and, hence, welfare—is strictly in-
creasing in k. In the equilibrium with the higher k, the host 
country's government always has the option of choosing the 
same expropriation rule as it would in the equilibrium with 
the lower k. Thus, the higher level of investment must raise 
the government's welfare. 
The Effect of an Investor Cartel 
Now we attempt to see how the collective interests of foreign 
investors differ from their individual interests. We do this by 
assuming that the investors form a cartel. This lets them take 
account of the effect that the level of investment has on the 
expropriation set chosen by the host country's government. It 
also lets them take account of the effect of changes in the 
level of investment on the marginal product of capital. 
Even collectively, the foreign investors want to maximize 
Table 1 
Assumed Parameter Values 
On Charts 1-2 and Tables 2-3 
Parameter Value 
Discount Factor (3 .96 
Growth Rate of Population 
in the Host Country n .06 
Endowment of the Consumption Good wz 
- Productivity Shock z 2.00 
Capital's Share 
in the Production Function a .33 
Real Interest Rate r .10 
Table 2 
Two Sample Equilibria 
Equilibrium Values 
Relative  Probability 
Risk Aversion  Capital-to-Labor  Expropriation  of Government 
in the Host Country  Ratio k  Cutoff Point z*  Not Expropriating n 
Low: y = 0.25  .235  1.142  .642 
High: y= 1.25  5.942  .500  1.000 
profits. They know the reaction function of the host country's 
government. Because the government believes that the level 
of per-capita investment will not change until expropriation 
occurs, its behavior is quite simple: for each level of invest-
ment today kt, there is an expropriation set Ze(kt).]4
 Because 
these sets do not vary over time, the investors' problem does 
not either. Hence, we again consider only time-invariant strat-
egies. 
PROPOSITION 2. An investor cartel may choose a larger or a 
smaller level of investment than the individual, decentralized 
investors would. 
Proof We provide the proof for the case with y< 1; the proof 
for y > 1 is similar. If y < 1, then the expropriation set is sim-
ple: Ze(k) is (z*(£),z]. Thus, the cartel's problem is 
(28) P = maxk{-(\+r)k + tc(J!:)£[(1 + zf(k))k\z e Zn\}. 
The first-order condition for this problem is 
(29) 0 = -(1-Hr) + KE[\ + zf\k)\z e ZN\ 
+ KE[zkf"(k)\z e Zn] 
+ k( 1 + z*f'(k))g(z*)(dz*/dk). 
All of these terms are intuitive. The first two are the same as 
those in the individual, decentralized case [equation (27)]. The 
third term takes into account the fact that the cartel can act as 
a monopolist in the investing of capital and so should take 
account of the effect of investment on the marginal product 
of capital. This term is negative and so reduces the optimal 
14Because the host country's government thinks the foreign investors will make the 
same per-capita investment in every period, the investors cannot promise higher invest-
ment in the future in order to induce better behavior today. There may be equilibria in 
which this is not so. But in such equilibria, the issue of time consistency would arise. 
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Table 3 
The Effects of an Investor Cartel on Two Sample Equilibria 
Relative 
Risk Aversion 
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amount of investment relative to the individual investment 
case. The fourth (and last) term takes account of the fact that 
the cartel can act as a leader: its choice of investment has an 
effect on the government's expropriation set. As shown in 
Proposition 1, increased investment reduces the probability of 
expropriation; that is, dz*/dk > 0. Thus, the fourth term in (29) 
is positive and will raise the optimal amount of investment 
relative to the individual investment case. In fact, dz*/dk in-
creases without bound as y goes to one (the log case, as in 
Charts 1 and 2), and/" can be close to zero. Thus, the fourth 
term in (29) can dominate the third. Q.E.D. 
Table 3 shows the investor cartel equilibrium for the two 
equilibria shown in Chart 1 (where, recall, the assumed pa-
rameters are as displayed in Table 1). With y= 0.25, addition-
al investment reduces an investor's profits, and the cartel in-
vests less than individual investors would. In contrast, with 
y= 0.99, additional investment (starting from the interior 
equilibrium) raises an investor's profits. In this case, the equi-
librium level of investment is the level that makes investment 
riskless.15 Here, as equation (29) predicted, the effect of in-
creased investment on the probability of expropriation is very 
large. 
This result implies that a centralized investment decision 
may lead to more capital investment rather than less. Such an 
increase could be accomplished without formal centralization 
if the foreign investors' government provided an investment 
subsidy. The increase in investment would be Pareto-improv-
ing because it would also benefit the host country. 
Concluding Remarks 
Our three major results are substantially different from those 
in the international debt literature. 
First, unlike with debt contracts, where a government only 
has an incentive to break its commitments in bad economic 
conditions (when output is low), with direct investment a gov-
ernment may have such an incentive under either good or bad 
economic conditions, depending on the degree of risk aver-
sion of agents in the host country. This result suggests that 
direct investment contracts may not be a promising substitute 
for loans to LDCs. It may also explain why direct investment 
flows have not increased to offset the curtailment in new pri-
vate foreign lending to nonoil LDCs. 
Second, increases in the level of direct investment in the 
host country can have the surprising effect of reducing the in-
centive for a government to expropriate and, hence, decreas-
ing the probability of that occurring. This is just the opposite 
of the result found in the international debt literature, where 
increased borrowing raises the likelihood of default. Not sur-
prisingly, this effect may cause a country to be stuck in a 
low-investment equilibrium when high-investment equilibria 
were possible. 
Finally, even in best possible equilibria, the level of invest-
ment chosen by individual, decentralized investors can be 
lower than the level they would choose as a cartel. This is be-
cause the reduction in title marginal product of capital caused 
by increased investment can be more than offset by the reduc-
tion in the probability of expropriation it causes. Again, this 
result is just the opposite of that for international debt. With 
debt, countries are better off if they can commit to limit their 
borrowing because doing so makes the debt safer, and as a 
result, the interest rate is reduced. 
15Note that the cartel case has only one equilibrium level of investment because the 
investors have no coordination problem. The cartel's equilibrium level of investment is 
higher than two of the three individual levels. 
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